Hackers Exploit VMware vCenter 0-Day Since September to Hijack Admin Accounts and Steal VM Data
What happened?
A suspected China-linked espionage group exploited a VMware vCenter Server zero-day in early September 2026, gaining administrator access and stealing files from a Windows virtual machine. Mandiant and Google Threat Intelligence Group (GTIG) attributed the intrusion to ARMORY CASTLE, formerly tracked as UNC5221. Broadcom disclosed the flaw, CVE-2026-123890, on November 19, more than two months after the earliest use documented in the investigation. The flaw carries a severity score of 9.8 out of 10. It affects VMware Directory Service, which supports vCenter’s single sign-on system.
Key details
- A China-linked espionage group exploited a VMware vCenter zero-day in early September 2026 to gain administrator access and steal virtual machine data.
- Mandiant and Google Threat Intelligence Group attributed the intrusion to ARMORY CASTLE, formerly tracked as UNC5221.
- The vulnerability CVE-2026-123890 affects VMware Directory Service and allows network attackers to bypass authentication as the built-in vSphere administrator.
- Attackers used custom tools BONESAW and SAWSNAKE to copy the vCenter directory database, create a rogue SSO admin account, and forge SAML tokens using stolen signing keys.
- The intrusion began with a separate zero-day in BeyondTrust Remote Support (CVE-2026-102764) in late August before moving to vCenter.
- Attackers accessed files inside a Windows virtual disk from the ESXi host, including Active Directory data, registry files, and DNS data, bypassing guest OS monitoring.
- Patching closes the flaw but does not remove rogue administrator accounts or invalidate stolen signing keys; logs must be reviewed for signs of compromise.
What is affected?
- VMware vCenter Server versions prior to 9.1.1.0200, 9.0.2.0200, and 8.0 Update 3m are affected.
- VMware Cloud Foundation 5.x customers are affected and should follow guidance for 5.2.5.
- vCenter 7.0 has no public fix; customers with extended support contracts must contact support.
How do I fix or mitigate it?
- VMware Cloud Foundation 5.x customers should follow Broadcom guidance for version 5.2.5.
- Restrict access to management networks to reduce exposure, though this does not replace the update.
- Preserve and review logs from vCenter, ESXi, and connected appliances for unexpected admin accounts, brief SSH enablement, new ESXi root SSH keys, and unusual virtual disk access.
- If compromise is found, revoke affected sessions, replace exposed signing keys and credentials, and assess risk to the wider Windows domain from stolen Active Directory data.
What should defenders look for?
- Unexpected administrator accounts in vCenter single sign-on.
- Brief periods when SSH was enabled on ESXi hosts.
- New ESXi root SSH keys appearing without authorization.
- Unusual access to virtual disks from the ESXi host layer.
- Stolen vCenter encryption material and database credentials used to access ESXi hosts.
Summarised by SecOraLens from Cyber Security News. Always read the original source before acting. How SecOraLens verifies advisories.
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