Ransomware at the hypervisor layer: how attackers use ESXi and vCenter features for malicious purposes
What happened?
Our Global Emergency Response Team (GERT) recently investigated an engagement in which an adversary destroyed an organization’s virtualization estate over a 10-day period. The campaign targeted four ESXi hosts, every virtual machine hosted on them, both vCenter Server Appliances, and all connected backup infrastructure. The ransom notes identified the attacker as the BlackNevas group, first observed in November 2024. What’s interesting about this attack is that no virtualization layer vulnerabilities were exploited: no guest-to-host escapes, no hypervisor memory corruption.
Key details
- BlackNevas ransomware group destroyed virtualization estate over 10 days targeting ESXi hosts, VMs, vCenter appliances, and backup infrastructure.
- Leaked Babuk ESXi ransomware source code lowered development barrier enabling at least ten ransomware families to build ESXi lockers.
- Compromise of virtualization management plane allows single attacker action to impact many hypervisor hosts and datastores simultaneously.
- EDR agents inside guest VMs cannot observe hypervisor processes modifying VMDK files, creating visibility asymmetry.
- Attackers established persistence on vCenter appliance via MeshAgent and Ligolo-ng reverse tunnel implemented as systemd service.
- CVE-2024-37085 allows AD permissions to become full ESXi administration through ESX Admins group behavior, exploited by Akira and Black Basta.
What is affected?
- ESXi hosts configured with Active Directory integration using ESX Admins group.
- vCenter Server Appliances accessible via valid administrative credentials.
- Unsupported ESXi versions targeted by Babuk-derived ransomware lockers.
How do I fix or mitigate it?
- Restrict access to ESXi and vCenter management interfaces to necessary network segments, accounts, and workstations.
- Configure vCenter RBAC and identity federation for virtualization administration; do not use ordinary enterprise credentials.
What should defenders look for?
- MeshAgent endpoint component of MeshCentral remote management platform on vCenter appliance.
- Ligolo-ng reverse tunnel implemented as systemd service on vCenter appliance.
- SSH compromise of vCenter appliance managing virtualization disaster recovery.
Summarised by SecOraLens from Securelist (Kaspersky). Always read the original source before acting. How SecOraLens verifies advisories.
What to do next
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